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Revolving Asset-Based Lending Contracts
and the Resolution of Debt-Related
Agency Problems
Richard L. Constand
Jerome S. Osteryoung
Donald A. Nast

Small firms that do not have access to organized financial markets must often
rely on secured commercial loans for their debt financing. In large firms, debtrelated agency problems are often resolved through the bond pricing process in
the formal debt markets. When these same debt-related agency problems arise in
small, private firms, the structure of the secured lending agreement must resolve
these problems. This study identifies debt-related agency problems as they exist
in private firms and examines howf the lending agreement resolves these problems.

INTRODUCTION
Financial theory is usually developed within the context of large, publicly
traded firms operating in a perfect market environment. In the Agency
literature, much of the work examines the debt-related agency problems
associated with the financing of large firms. Small firms, however, do not
have access to the formal debt markets and are forced to rely on revolving
secured commercial loans for much of their debt capital. In these situations,
the secured lending agreement must reduce or eliminate the debt-related
agency costs. The purpose of this current paper is to focus attention on how
secured loan agreements affect debt-related agency problems in small,
privately owned firms.
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section, a general review
of the theory of agency is presented. The second section examines revolving
Asset-Based Loan (ABL) arrangements used by many privately owned firms
as their dominant source of debt financing. In the third section, the debtrelated agency problem literature is reviewed and similar problems are
identified in firms using ABL financing. It is also shown how the structure
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of the revolving loan agreement resolves these problems w^ithout the need
of a market pricing mechanism. The final section contains a summary and
conclusions.
I.

AGENCY THEORY

Accounting Theory of Agency
Baiman [2] defines the basic accounting related agency problem as the
construction of a Pareto-optimal employment contract. The ideal contract
is a “first best” contract that is self-enforcing and results in an optimal level
of effort by the agent and an optimal distribution of risk betv^^een the agent
and the principal without any associated information or monitoring costs.
A “second best” contract is an optimal situation given a specific information
set and is a result of the balance between the value added to the firm from
the use of additional information and the cost of obtaining that information.
Since information is costly, the achievement of a second best contract is
considered optimal and is accomplished using managerial accounting
systems to gather information and monitor the agent’s activities.
Financial Theory of Agency
Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet [4] describe agency problems as productive
inefficiencies that arise from conflicting interests of various parties associated
with the financing and management of a corporation. The three categories
of participants—owners, managers and external financiers—act in their own
self interest, thus creating various agency problems.
These agency problems and their resolution within the corporate
environment have been examined by a number of authors. Jensen and
Meckling [14] discuss how the inclusion of debt in the capital structure of
the firm can induce owner/managers to invest in high risk projects in an
attempt to expropriate wealth from bondholders. Ross [24] and Leland and
Pyle [15] discuss the agency problems associated with the existence of
asymmetric information and discuss the role of signaling to the markets in
the resolution of those problems. Haugen and Senbet discuss bankruptcy
costs as an offset to the tax benefits of debt financing and the implications
for capital structure. Myers [16] shows that with debt in the capital structure
a firm’s owner may underinvest by foregoing positive net present value
projects if the incremental benefits associated with the projects accrue only
to the debtholders of the firm. Within the Myers framework, rational
bondholders recognize this risk and lower the price they are willing to pay
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for the bonds, thus forcing owners to bear the associated costs. Barnea,
Haugen, and Senbet [5] argue that the pricing mechanism in the formal debt
markets resolves this type of problem. Ang [1] examines the opposite case
in which a firm overinvests in underutilized physical assets and the market
for corporate restructuring resolves the problem. Most of this existing work
focuses on the agency problems in large public firms that raise funds from
external sources. In these situations, the problems are resolved through the
security market pricing function. Many firms, however, do not issue publicly
traded securities but still need to obtain debt financing from external sources
such as commercial lenders. This situation allows agency problems to
develop in an environment with no formal mairket discipline. In these
situations, second-best contracts of the type described in the Accounting
literature are needed to minimize the related agency costs.
Small Firm Agency Theory
Research on small firm agency problems is scarce. Hand, Lloyd, and
Rogow [11] examine the resolutions of agency problems brought about by
conflicts between insider owner/managers and non-insider minority equity
holders in the small firm context. They also discuss how a stockholders’
agreement that is executed at the time of organization can be structured in
such a way as to reduce many of these small firm agency problems. Issues
that can be dealt with in the stockholders’ agreement include limits on
managerial compensation, limits on dividends, and restrictions that guard
against dilution of existing shareholders’ control over the firm.
Pettit and Singer [22], in a review of small firm research topics, discuss
the direct and indirect costs of small firm debt financing. They also note
that they know of no existing research focusing on debt-related agency
problems in small firms and suggest that the structure of secured, heavily
monitored, short term loans to small firms is most likely a response to the
need to control these problems. Revolving ABL arrangements have the
specific characteristics described by Pettit and Singer.
Constand, Osteryoung, and Nast [8] em pirically examine the
relationships between small firm characteristics and the use of leverage in
firms that use revolving asset-based loans as a source of financing. They
interpret their results within the context of large firm agency theory and find
that many factors identified by other authors as affecting leverage in large
firms do not affect the use of leverage in small firms. These past studies
indicate a clear need for an examination of the relationship between agency
problems and small firm debt financing.
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REVOLVING ASSET-BASED LOAN FINANCING

Herskowitz and Kaplowitz [13] describe the revolving ABL process as a
financing arrangement in which a bank has agreed to supply continuous
secured financing to the borrower over a three to five year period. The
financing is collateralized by current assets such as accounts receivable and
inventory and the amount of the established credit line at any point in time
is based on a percentage “advance rate” of the balances of the eligible working
capital assets. The advance rate for eligible receivables is usually 70 to 80
percent of book value; the advance rate for eligible inventory is usually 30
to 40 percent of book value. Since the assets used to secure the loan are highly
liquid, the lender closely monitors the activities of the borrower. The ABL
process is discussed at length in books by Clark [6] and Robinson [23] and
in numerous articles (see Stacy [25], Barbarosh and Tong [3], English [9],
Gilbert [10], Herskowitz and Kaplowitz [13], Pendley [17, 18, 19, 20, 21] and
Constand [7]).
In a revolving ABL arrangement, the borrower and lender must balance
their immediate self interest against the long-term benefits associated with
cooperative behavior. For the borrower, the loan covenants and the
monitoring activities of the lender may, at first, seem excessive. Furthermore,
there are explicit financing costs associated with the financing arrangement.
The explicit costs associated with ABL financing are very high and usually
consist of paying an interest rate 2% to 4% over the prime rate and paying
various fees that cover the costs of the lender’s monitoring activities. In most
cases, however, the firm’s restricted access to the organized financial markets
makes the costs associated with formal debt issues or equity even higher than
those associated with ABL financing. In such cases, the borrowers have no
other rational choice.
Although revolving ABL financing does have disadvantages associated
with its structure, it also provides a flexible form of external debt financing
for the private firm. Over the short term the amount of funds fluctuates to
meet seasonal demands for working capital. Over the longer term, as the firm
grows, increased debt financing is made available to fund the required
increases in permanent working capital investment.
From the lender’s point of view, the lender is at risk for possible losses
arising from the activities of the borrower. This risk for the lender arises from
a number of debt-related agency problems. Although the lender could avoid
these risks by refusing to extend loans to a firm, the lender would also sacrifice
the associated fee and interest income. It is in the best interest of the lender
to extend the loan and properly manage the associated risk through the
structure of the lending agreement.
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ASSET-BASED LENDING AND AGENCY THEORY

Most firms involved in the ABL process are private corporations whose
common stock is not pubhcly traded and whose debt obligations are usually
collateralized commercial loans rather than formal debt issues. This ABL
type of financing results in a complex agency relationship with the lender
as principal and the borrower as agent. Without the market to resolve agency
problems, an ABL Security Agreement must provide a solution. This
Security Agreement is a standardized legal document that is structured under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). It describes the rights
and responsibilities of the parties to the revolving financing agreement and
can be considered a second-best contract that significantly reduces debtrelated agency problems.
Informational Asymmetry
Informational asymmetry exists when managers (or owner/managers)
possess information about the true nature of the firm that outsiders do not
have (see Ross [24] and Leland and Pyle [15]). If a firm is privately owned
and managed and the owner/manager seeks external sources of funding, this
information gap must be bridged by the owner/manager so the true value
of the firm is revealed to potential investors. The agency costs associated with
this process are borne by the owner/manager.
The owner/manager’s choice of external funding is between equity or
debt. If equity funding is chosen, there are numerous costs involved. First,
there are direct issue costs, such as investment banker fees, associated with
identifying potential investors and informing them about the value of the
firm. Second, there are indirect issue costs due to the tendency for equity
markets to underprice new issues as a result of ambiguous signaling of the
firm’s true value. Furthermore, there are additional costs such as the portion
of future residual profits to be paid to the new shareholders. Finally, the
existing tax structure penalizes equity financing through the double taxation
of dividends.
If the owner/manager of a privately held firm seeks external debt
financing rather than equity financing, the direct issue costs and the indirect
costs associated with ambiguous signaling to external debtors still exist. The
other costs of equity financing do not apply in that there is no sharing of
future residual profits and rather than a tax disadvantage, there exists a tax
subsidy from the tax shield effect. Because of these lower costs, debt financing
is often preferred over equity issues. However, the cost of issuing debt
securities is still prohibitive for relatively small, privately held corporations.
Fortunately, the direct costs of issuing formal debt securities can be avoided
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if the debt financing is obtained from commercial lenders. With commercial
loans, the only costs associated with the existence of asymmetric information
are the costs of informing the lenders about the true state of the firm.
Furthermore, since commercial lenders work closely with borrowers and have
developed efficient methods of monitoring the borrower’s actions, the
monitoring costs may be less than those associated with small firm debt
issues. This point was well made by Hand, Lloyd, and Rogow [11].
If a firm relies on a revolving ABL for its debt financing, two aspects
of the structure of the lending agreement reduce the asymmetric information
problem. First, the initial audit of the borrower’s assets provide the lender
with the information required to decide if a loan will be made. Second, the
monitoring performed periodically by the lender keeps the lender informed
about changes in the borrower’s assets.
The initial audit is performed by the lender before the decision to extend
a revolving ABL and involves a financial analysis of the firm’s accounting
records and verification of the assets to be used as collateral. Verification
involves on-site visits and telephone interviews with the borrower’s credit
customers. This initial audit process allows the lender to gather needed
inform ation prior to the lending decision, reduces the information
asymmetry, and allows a rational debt pricing schedule to be devised. The
costs involved with this audit are often included in the loan fee structure
or embedded in the interest charges.
Once a revolving credit has been established, the possibility exists that
the information gap between the borrower and the lender will increase as
time passes. To prevent this from happening, the ABL arrangement requires
continual disclosure of firm specific information to the lender. This
disclosure process is described in the Security Agreement and requires the
borrower to keep extensive financial records and to allow the lender
unrestricted access to those records. When revolving ABLs are collateralized
by inventory and receivables whose balances change daily, the lender is
informed at the close of each business day of the new account balances. This
daily reporting allows the lender to recalculate the value of collateral and
adjust the lending limits. Furthermore, the process allows the lender to keep
fully appraised of the firm’s value. The costs of this monitoring process are
passed on to the borrower and represent the costs of reducing the asymmetric
information problem.
Bankruptcy and Loan Default
One of the debt-related agency costs is the cost associated with
bankruptcy. Haugen and Senbet [12] (H&S hereafter) examine the issue of
bankruptcy and the resulting impact on the existence of an optimal capital
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Structure. H&S define bankruptcy as the chain of events in which the firm
fails to meet its fixed payment obhgations and the firm’s creditors take legal
possession of the firm. They classify the associated costs of the ownership
transfer as direct or indirect. Direct costs are legal, accounting, and trustee
fees associated with the transfer of ownership. Indirect costs are the
opportunity costs of the interruption of the firm’s sales revenues during the
ownership transfer. H&S also argue that the decision to liquidate the assets
of the firm is a pure capital budgeting decision whose costs should not be
included as bankruptcy costs. H&S argue that the owners could avoid the
formal transfer of ownership by selling new equity shares and using the
proceeds to repurchase the outstanding fixed claims on the firm at a fair
market price. With this option, the true costs of bankruptcy would be the
lesser of the costs of the forced, formal ownership transfer or the transactions
costs of the restructuring of the firm prior to a forced ownership transfer.
The discussion of bankruptcy by H&S is not applicable to firms that
rely on revolving ABLs due to the definition of bankruptcy and the process
of informal reorganization of the firm. In the H&S scenario, default on the
debt agreement precipitates either bankruptcy or an informal reorganization
of the firm that avoids bankruptcy. When a revolving ABL is used, default
is a separate event from bankruptcy. Furthermore, since the small firm cannot
issue formal securities, the firm has no option to reorganize informally.
Default w ithin the context of a revolving ABL is not a generic concept
that applies to all firms using debt financing. Instead, the specific actions
that constitute default are defined in the Security Agreement that describes
the rights and obligations of both parties involved in a particular financing
relationship. Legal, accounting, and trustee expenses identified as direct costs
of bankruptcy by H&S are actually default related costs when ABLs are used.
These various costs are controlled through the ABL monitoring structure.
If an ABL agreement is structured under Article 9 of the UCC and
evidence of the agreement is registered with the appropriate governmental
agency, the secured lender has established contingent legal rights in the
collateralized assets owned by the borrowers. If default occurs the lender can
take immediate possession of the assets, liquidate them, and use the proceeds
for repayment of the outstanding debt. Since receivables often provide the
majority of the ABL collateral, a special deposit account called a collateral
account is used to insure that the lender controls the cash proceeds of the
collateralized receivables.
The ABL Security Agreement usually requires that all payments on
receivables accounts be mailed directly to a lockbox controlled by the lender.
The lender endorses the payments and deposits them into the collateral
account. Periodically, the balance of this account is applied against the balance
of the revolving loan. If the borrower acts in such a way that constitutes default,
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legal ownership of the collateralized receivables is immediately transferred to
the lender and the lender informs the borrower’s account debtors that payments
should continue to be made as they have in the past. As the outstanding
receivables are repaid, the proceeds are applied against the outstanding loan
balance. Since the loan funds advanced only represented 80% of eligible
receivables, the entire outstanding loan balance is usually repaid.
Given this aspect of the ABL structure, the legal costs of default are
minimal or non-existent. Furthermore, since ownership of the collateralized
assets can be transferred to the secured lender without bankruptcy, there are
no trustee related costs. Even if bankruptcy occurs simultaneously with
default, the legal claim held by the secured lender on the collateralized assets
ranks ahead of the claims of bankruptcy trustees and trustee related costs do
not impact the debtholders. Finally, since the structure of the lending
arrangement requires daily monitoring of the borrower’s books by the lender,
the accounting costs of default are immaterial.
Investment in H igh Risk Projects
Jensen and Meckling [14] (J&M hereafter) explain the tendency for
owner/managers who operate firms utilizing financial leverage to invest in
high risk projects. The use of debt financing by the owner/manager is viewed
as a European Call Option on the residual value of the firm. The debt
repayment represents the strike or exercise price of the call option and the
value of the firm represents the underlying asset on which the call is written.
Expiration occurs when the debt used in the financing of the firm matures
and must be repaid.
If the value of the firm is greater than the amount of the debt repayment,
the owner/manager will repay the debt and claim the residual firm value.
If, however, the debt repayment amount is greater than the value of the firm,
the owner/manager will default on the debt and the debtors will claim the
firm assets as partial repayment of the debt obligation. This decision to
default by the owner/manager is similar to the refusal to exercise an outof-the money call option.
Prior to the maturity of the debt (i.e., the expiration of the call option),
the value of the owner/manager’s claim on the firm is directly related to the
variance of the firm’s operating ezirnings. As the variance of the firm’s
earnings increase, the value of the call on the residual value increases. Given
a choice of two investment opportunities with equal expected returns but
different variances, a rational owner/manager will choose the opportunity
with the highest variance of returns. There is a greater chance that the
residual value of the firm after the debt repayment will be larger than if the
investment opportunity with the lower variance had been chosen.
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A key factor of this scenario is the separation of the financing decision
and the investment decision. The supphers of debt capital have already
committed funds prior to management’s investment decision. With the funds
in hand, management only considers the consequences of the investment
decision. There exists no immediate constraint on management’s behavior;
they are free to invest in high risk investments.
A similar type of incentive to invest in risky assets may occur w^hen a
firm pledges its receivables as collateral in a revolving ABL arrangement.
If a lender agrees to accept all current and future receivables as collateral
on a non-recourse basis, the lender has essentially agreed to provide debt
financing before the actual decision to invest in a particular receivable is
made. The owner/manager has the incentive to extend trade credit to
customers who have questionable credit reputations, pledge the resulting
receivables as collateral, and borrow against these risky receivables without
regard to the probability of default. To prevent this from occurring, lenders
in revolving ABLs have established a process of screening and monitoring
the quality of collateralized receivables. This process links the lender’s
decision to provide debt financing with the investment to be funded by the
loan.
Before the lender accepts a borrower’s receivables as collateral, the lender
performs an initial screening of the receivable accounts. This screening
involves the classification of the receivables as either eligible or ineligible
collateral. Some types of accounts, such as intra-company accounts, progress
billings, seasonal datings or bill-and-hold arrangements, are immediately
considered ineligible as collateral due to their complicated structure and their
potential for generating disputes between the lender and borrower. Other
receivables are reviewed and may be classified as too risky for collateral if
the account debtors’ payment habits indicate they are poor credit risks. Only
after the eligible accounts have been identified will the lender advance the
loan funds and accept the eligible accounts as collateral.
After the initial credit advance, the lender continues to monitor the value
of the collateral by reviewing the credit sales related documents that reflect
changes in the receivables and by verifying the outstanding account balances.
This is done on either a daily or a weekly basis. As new receivables are created,
the lender advances additional funds only if the receivables represent sales
to eligible account debtors. By structuring the lending agreement in this way,
the borrower must make the decision to invest in a receivable with an
acceptable level of risk before the additional loan funds are advanced from
the lender. If the new receivable represents a high risk, the lender will not
accept the account as eligible and will not advance additional funds. This
linkage between the investment and financing decision resolves the risky
investment problem.
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U nderinvestment
Myers [16] explains how the underinvestment problem develops when
debt financing is used by management. He makes the distinction between
investments in “assets-in-place” and investments in “growth opportunities”
where growth opportunities are described as options on future assets acquired
by the firm. He sets up a two-period example where management will
underinvest by foregoing certain positive net present value (NPV) investment
projects in which the incremental benefits of the project accrue only to the
debtholders.
In his two-period model, Myers defines three points in time. At the
beginning of the first period, the firm issues debt to be repaid at the end
of period two. At the end of period one, the true value of the firm’s investment
opportunity is revealed to management and management decides whether
or not to invest in the project. Since repayment of the debt is assumed to
be supported entirely by the proceeds of the investment, a decision not to
invest implies a decision to default on the debt issue at maturity.
When management is required to make the investment decision at the
end of period one, it decides based on the relationship between the size of
the positive NPV of the investment project and the present value of the debt
repayment due at the end of period two. Myers argues that if the NPV of
the investment is less than the present value of the debt repayment,
management will pass up the investment. Only if the positive NPV of the
investment exceeds the present value of the debt repayment will it be in the
best interest of owner/managers to accept the project. W ithin the Myers’
framework, the suppliers of debt recognize this potential behavior and adjust
the market price they are willing to pay for the firm’s bond issues.
Due to the structure of the revolving ABL Security Agreement, this
underinvestment problem cannot exist. In the Myers framework the debt is
unsecured and the owner/managers receive the loan proceeds prior to the
investment decision. In an ABL agreement, the debt is secured by assets such
as inventory and receivables accounts. For the owner/managers to qualify
for advances against the credit line, investment in the collateralized assets
must have already taken place. W ithout the investment, the extension of
additional credit does not occur. Any future investment decisions should have
no impact on the repayment of the existing debt. Liquidation of the
collateralized assets either through the normal course of business or through
bankruptcy induced liquidation will assure repayment of the loan. The
problem is resolved ex-ante by linking the investment and lending decision
within the revolving ABL structure.
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Overinvestment
Ang [1] argues that firms employing debt financing have an incentive
to retain physical assets that would be disposed of by a firm financed by 100%
equity. The key to the analysis is that much of the risk associated with owner/
managers’ decisions is borne by the debtholders. If the levered firm owns an
underutilized asset the owner/managers have the choice of either selling the
asset for a known liquidation value or retaining the asset in the hopes of
realizing a greater liquidation value in the future. Ang argues that an
underutilized asset can be thought of as a perpetual out-of-the money option
and in certain situations, the value of this option to the firm’s management
is greater than the asset’s current liquidation value. If this occurs, the
underutilized asset will be retained.
In essence, the Ang argument is similar to the problem of excessively
risky investment strategies undertaken by management. Management
chooses to speculate in assets whose unknown future value may or may not
exceed the current liquidation value. If the assets fail to appreciate in value,
or depreciate in value, the value of the firm is decreased and the risk of default
on the outstanding debt is increased.
Ang shows that the construction of an optimal debt contract can resolve
this overinvestment problem. He argues that the market for corporate
restructuring allows ineffective existing debt contracts to be replaced by new,
more effective debt contracts that resolve this overinvestment problem.
This overinvestment problem could occur with inventory investments
as well as in investments in long term projects. Investment in raw materials
would be especially sensitive to this type of speculative activity. In Ang’s
presentation, the problem is resolved through the construction of an optimal
debt contract during the restructuring of the firm. For firms using revolving
ABL financing, the optimal contract is the section of the Security Agreement
that describes the role of collateralized inventory in the secured loan
agreement. The contract not only prevents overinvestment in inventory, but
is structured so it also prevents potential abuses of the secured financing
process itself.
In addition to the reason for overinvestment, borrowers in a commercial
loan arrangement have an additional incentive to overinvest in inventory.
If the commercial loan is unsecured, an overinvestment in inventory
represents an increase in assets; a process that the lender may interpret as
a decrease in the probability of loss if default occurs. This increase in assets
may increase the amount of funds that the lender is willing to advance to
the borrower. Furthermore, if a borrower has excess inventory on hand and
finds that the realizable value of the collateralized inventory has fallen below
the am ount of the funds borrowed against the assets, there exists the incentive
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to continue to hold the inventory. Even if a working capital term loan is
collateralized with a blanket inventory lien, the problem still may exist. At
the extreme, if the borrower does not consider his operation a going concern,
there is the incentive to invest heavily in inventory and other assets, inflate
the book value of the assets, obtain term loans by pledging the assets, and
default on the loan.
To prevent overinvestment in inventory, the revolving ABL structure
includes a system of inventory monitoring procedures. These procedures,
outlined in the Security Agreement, are used by the lender to assess the
collateral value of the inventory prior to the initial loan disbursement and
every three to six months over the life of the ABL arrangement. This collateral
value is used to determine the amount of loan funds provided to the borrower.
The first stage in the lender’s monitoring of the inventory includes an
aging of the inventory accounts and the calculation of inventory turnover.
This analysis is usually performed for each of the three categories of
inventory: raw materials, work-in-process, and finished goods. The results
of the analysis are compared to industry information to see if the borrower’s
inventory investment activities are similar to those of other firms. Inventory
considered too old by industry standards is disallowed as eligible collateral
for the ABL. After the inventory accounts have been examined, a physical
inspection of the inventory by the lender’s audit department is performed
to verify the reported quantities of inventory. Finally, the lender obtains an
estimate of the liquidation values for raw materials and finished goods.
Work-in-process inventory usually has zero liquidation value and is
ineligible for use as collateral. Once the lender has identified the eligible
inventory, the appropriate advance rate is applied to the book value to
determine the amount of loan funds that will be supplied. This advance rate
is usually low (30%-40%) and reflects the estimated liquidation value of the
eligible inventory.
This loan structure discourages overinvestment in inventory in many
ways. First, as noted, inventory classified as too old is not included in the
lender’s valuation of the eligible collateral. Second, the low advance rate
insures that the minimum market value, or liquidation value, of the
collateralized assets is large enough to repay the portion of the loan supported
by those assets. Third, the low advance rate on inventory and the relatively
higher advance rate on eligible receivables encourages owner/managers to
increase efforts to sell existing inventory to acceptable credit customers, thus
creating new receivables with a greater collateral value in order to secure
additional financing. Finally, the security interest held by secured lenders
in the inventory of the borrower is usually a blanket lien that extends to all
inventory. This structure insures that if overinvestment occurs, the lender
has a legal claim against the additional inventory owned by the firm even
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though the overinvestment process provides no benefits to the borrower.
These aspects of the ABL structure remove the potential gain to the borrower
associated with overinvestment in inventory.
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Privately owned firms without access to formal securities markets must rely
on commercial lenders as sources for their debt financing. Revolving AssetBased Lending agreements, a form of commercial financing whose use has
increased greatly in recent years, are used to structure and monitor secured
lending agreements between firms and their debtholders, the commercial
lenders. These agreements are complex financial contracts that work to
minimize or resolve debt-related agency problems that occur in privately held
firms. The costs associated with the resolution of these problems are the
monitoring costs associated with the secured lender’s activities. These costs
are passed on to the borrowers by the lenders in the form of explicit loan
fees.
This paper examines the role of ABL contracts in the control of debtrelated agency problems. More work needs to be done. There is still a need
for a more rigorous modeling of agency problems in small private firms.
This modeling should include the linkage between investment decisions and
financing decisions. Additional empirical research is also needed in order
to examine the validity of both existing and future agency models. Along
the same lines, an examination of the use of both secured and unsecured
debt may reveal more information about the importance of secured lending
contracts in the reduction of agency costs. Hopefully, more researchers will
undertake work in this area in the future.
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